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Goodman: An Exception to Administering Miranda Warnings Exists Where Polic

CRIMINAL LAW-Fifth Amendment Miranda Warnings-An
Exception to Administering Miranda Warnings Exists
Where Police Questioning is Prompted by Concern for
Public Safety

-

U.S.

-,

New York v. Quar/es,
104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).

Officer Frank Kraft entered an all-night supermarket in pursuit of an
armed suspect and immediately identified Benjamin Quarles as that suspect.' When Quarles fled, Officer Kraft followed and apprehended him in
the rear of the supermarket.' As three other officers arrived with guns
drawn, Kraft frisked Quarles and discovered an empty gun holster.3 Without administering Mirandawarnings, 4 Kraft asked the handcuffed Quarles
where the gun was.' Quarles gestured toward a nearby stack of cartons
and replied, "the gun is over there."6 Kraft retrieved a loaded .38 caliber
handgun from the cartons and then placed Quarles under formal arrest.7

104 S. Ct. 2626, 2629, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 554
1.See New York v. Quarles, - U.S....
(1984). Officer Kraft and his partner were responding to a recently reported sexual assault.
See id at , 104 S.Ct. at 2629, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554. The rape victim described her assailant
as an armed, black male, approximately six feet in height, wearing a black jacket with "Big
Ben" emblazoned on the back. Seeid at _ 104 S. Ct. at 2629, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554. Officer
Kraft used this description to identify Benjamin Quarles. See id at -, 104 S.Ct. at 2629, 81
L. Ed. 2d at 554.
2. See id at - 104 S.Ct. at 2629-30, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554. During the brief pursuit,
Officer Kraft lost sight of Quarles for a few seconds as Quarles turned at the end of an aisle.
at , 104 S.Ct. at 2629-30, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554. Kraft had his gun drawn throughout
See id.
the pursuit and apprehension. See id at _ 104 S.Ct. at 2629, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554.
3. See id.
at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 30 (1968) (patdown of suspect's person to ensure officer's safety permissible).
4. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). The Miranda Court stated "[a
person] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires." Id.at 479.
5. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S .... 104 S.Ct. 2630, 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 554
(1984).
6. See id at __ 104 S.Ct. at 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554.
7. See id.at - 104 S. Ct. at 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554. After the formal arrest,
Quarles was given Miranda warnings; he waived his rights to silence and an attorney's presence and, in response to further police interrogation, he claimed ownership of the gun. See
id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554.
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During Quarles' prosecution for criminal possession of a weapon, 8
Quarles' motion to suppress the gun and all statements concerning the gun
was granted because of the failure to observe Miranda.9 The Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, affirmed the suppression order
without opinion.'0 The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed, stating
that there had been a clear violation of Mirandaand declining to recognize
any exigency exception to Mirandds requirements." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari' 2 to determine whether the rule of Miranda is subject to an exigency exception. 13 Held-Reversed and remanded An exception to administering Miranda warnings exists where
police questioning is prompted by concern for public safety.' n
The fifth amendment guarantees that incriminating statements obtained
through governmental coercion shall not be used against the defendant in
a criminal proceeding.' 5 As a necessary requirement of the fifth amendment's language, the United States Supreme Court has recognized an ex8. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02(4) (McKinney 1980) (person guilty of criminal possession of gun if he carries loaded gun away from home or business). Charges against
Quarles for rape were not pursued by the state. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _, - n.2,
104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.2, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 555 n.2 (1984).
9. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. __,
, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 555
(1984).
10. See People v. Quarles, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84, 84 (App. Div. 1981), afd 444 N.E.2d 984,
985, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (1982), rev'd and remanded sub nom. New York v. Quarles, U.S. - 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).
11. See People v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (1982), rev'd and
remanded sub noma. New York v. Quarles, - U.S. -., 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550
(1984). The court of appeals found no evidence in the record that there was a risk posed to
the police officers or to the general public under the circumstances or that the interrogation
was prompted by such concerns on Kraft's part. See id at 985, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 521-22.
12. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 2118, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1299 (1983).
13. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2630, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 555.
14. See id at _ 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides: "No person. .. shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " Id The selfincrimination privilege of the fifth amendment is applicable to state as well as federal action.
See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). The privilege against self-incrimination is enjoyed only by an individual as a basic civil right. Compare United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694, 698 (1944) (privilege enjoyed only by human being as citizen of U.S.) with Wilson v.
United States, 221 U.S. 361, 365 (1911) (corporate entity does not possess privilege against
self-incrimination). The fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause is the result of several
centuries of struggle against arbitrary procedures by governmental authorities. See E. GRiSWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7, 30 (1955). For an extensive discussion of the
origins and development of the self-incrimination privilege, see generally M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

1-41 (1980). See also Sunderland, Se/f-Incrimination and ConstitutionalPrinciple.- Miranda
v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 178-88 (1979) (tracing fifth amendment from English origin to American constitutional provision).
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clusionary mandate for all incriminating testimonial evidence obtained by
governmental compulsion.' 6 The privilege has been described as an essential bulwark in protecting an accused from an arbitrary, inquisitional government prosecution. 17 Four basic purposes of the privilege have been
enunciated: (1) preservation of the criminal accusatorial system,' 8 (2) protection of the individual against the power of the government,' 9 (3) achieving reliable and voluntary evidence, 20 and (4) protection of privacy
rights.2 ' While the fifth amendment applies directly to federal authorities,

16. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (fifth amendment established
absolute constitutional exclusionary rule for coerced testimonial evidence); see also Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) (fifth amendment is itself a constitutional exclusionary rule). Non-testimonial evidence is not protected by the privilege. See, e.g., United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. i, 5-7 (1973) (voice recordings are not testimonial evidence
excluded by privilege); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1967) (handwriting samples not excluded because nontestimonial in nature); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
765 (1966) (blood sample not testimonial evidence protected by privilege); see also Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (fifth amendment's absolute mandate does not exclude non-testimonial evidence). See generally Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of
Criminal Procedure,53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 949 (1965) (fruits of interrogations should not
necessarily be suppressed in all situations).
17. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) ("[T]he privilege, while
sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a protection to the innocent.' "). For a similar
view, see Ritchie, Compulsion That Violates the Fifh Amendment. The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384-86 (1977), which discusses the fifth amendment's basic purpose. But see Berger, The UnderprivilegedStatus of the Fih Amendment Privilege, 15 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 194-96 (1978) (questioning whether underlying rationales of fifth amendment have been truly enunciated by Supreme Court).
18. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (fifth amendment's privilege
works to guarantee adversarial nature of criminal justice system); see also Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 231 (1971) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting) (privilege's objective is to safeguard adversarial system of justice). See generally Stone,
The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 156-57 (fifth amendment
protects integrity of judicial system).
19. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8-9 (1964) (purpose of self-incrimination clause to
protect individuals when confronted by all-powerful state); accord Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (privilege requires fair balance between the individual and
the state). For a discussion on this purpose of the privilege, see generally Friendly, The Fifth
Amendment Tomorrow- The Casefor ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 723
(1968). For a similar view, see E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 30 (1955),
which asserts that the privilege protects individual dignity regardless of guilt.
20. See In reGault, 387 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1967) (privilege prevents use of coerced, unreliable statements); see also McKay, Self-Incriminationandthe New Privacy, 1967 SuP. CT. REV.
193, 205-07 (privilege prevents use of coerced statements'because coercion creates unreliable
confessions); Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and ConstitutionalPrinciple. Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 171, 187 (1979) (coercive techniques produce
unreliable statements and privilege justifies exclusion).
21. See Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966) (basis for
privilege is respect for individual's privacy); see also Berger, The UnderprivilegedStatus of
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the Supreme Court initially addressed the use of self-incriminating statements obtained by state coercion through the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.2 2
Prior to 1966, the Supreme Court utilized the due process clause 23 of the
fourteenth amendment to exclude incriminating statements obtained by
police through methods "revolting to the sense of justice. '"24 The Court
developed the coerced confession doctrine to exclude statements thought
to be unreliable or involuntary due to questionable police tactics. 25 The
doctrine, operating on a case-by-case determination, excluded only those
statements shown to be the result of actual coercion by the police. 26 The

the Fith Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 213 (1978) (privilege intended to
protect individual privacy and dignity). But see Friendly, The Fith Amendment Tomorrow,
The Casefor ConstitutionalChange, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 687-88 (1968) (protecting privacy not primary purpose of privilege against self-incrimination). For a complete summary
of the privilege's underlying purposes, see Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to
the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 443-45 (1984).
22. Compare Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 564 (1897) (fifth amendment applies
to exclude statements obtained through federal coercion) with Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936) (due process governs coerced statements obtained by state officials). See also
Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 101-04 (due process requires discussion of initial suppression of coerced statements).
23. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). The fourteenth amendment
provides, in part: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.
...See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i. In Brown, the police
physically beat the suspect to obtain a signed confession to a murder. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-83 (1936).
24. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (standard for excluding statements established in Court's first coerced confession case).
25. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961) (coerced confession excluded as offensive to the accusatorial system); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173
(1952) (statements obtained by physical violence offend public's sense of fair play embodied
in due process clause); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-42 (1940) (physical torture
violates all notions of due process; statements obtained accordingly excluded). See generally
W. LAFAVE & J.ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.4, at 580-86 (1984) (coerced confessions
excluded because due process prohibits use of untrustworthy testimony). The Court created
both a subjective and objective test to determine whether the testimony must be excluded for
due process violations. Compare Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (subjective test utilized to determine if suspect gave voluntary statement even though coerced) and
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957) (suspect's personal qualities critical considerations in determining voluntariness of statement) with Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
404-06 (1945) (objective standards determine standards of fairness when accused physically
abused) and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (certain coercive techniques
violate fundamental fairness regardless of individual's propensity to be affected). See generally Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. CHI. L. REV.
313, 315-25 (1964) (reviewed rationales of coerced confession doctrine).
26. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); see also Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547, 554-55 (1942) (actual coercion must be present to warrant due process exclusion). Actual coercion was determined from the totality of the circumstances, but contradictory deci-
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inadequacy of the coercive confession doctrine to effectively protect a suspect's privilege against self-incrimination, to protect the integrity of the
judicial system, and to deter the police from overzealous interrogation
methods prompted the Supreme Court to address the problem indirectly
first,2 7 and then directly in Miranda v. Arizona.2 8
In Miranda v. Arizona,29 the Supreme Court recognized an absolute exclusionary rule, based upon the fifth amendment, for statements obtained
during official custodial interrogation without prior administration of specific warnings.3" The Court created a constitutional presumption of inher-

sions emerged from this approach. Compare Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 230-38
(1941) (physical slapping of suspect to elicit statement did not violate due process) with
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-43 (1940) (physical beating violated due process
standards). The due process approach has been criticized as ineffective. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring) (case-by-case due process approach to incriminating statements has little or no effect in curbing police or prosecutorial
zeal in obtaining those statements); see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 7.4, at 580-92 (1984) (voluntariness test inadequate and ill-defined standard for protecting
suspect's interests); Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession?-Some Comment on Inbau and Reid's "CriminalInterrogationand Confessions," 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 746-47
(1963) (due process, voluntariness approach offers little protection for accused).
27. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (statements obtained
through interrogation after accusatory stage of judicial process excluded by sixth amendment). The Massiah decision did not apply to the majority of police interrogation circumstances; therefore, the Court next addressed the problem in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478, 490-92 (1964). In Escobedo, while the Court suppressed the statement on sixth amendment grounds, the right to remain silent was recognized and intimated as arising from the
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 491-92. The Escobedo decision raised as many problems about the status of the self-incrimination clause as it solved,
but it did indicate the Court's concern over the coerced confession area. See Sonenshein,
Mirandaand the Burger Court.: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 408-4 10
(1982) (Escobedo predecessor to Miranda), see also Comment, The Curious Confusion Surrounding Escobedo v. Illinois, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 560, 561 (1965) (Escobedo imprecise attempt to deal with incriminating statements). The Court's final piece of groundwork for the
Miranda decision was the incorporation of the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause
into the due process clause. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (fifth amendment's
standards governing self-incrimination apply to state actions and prosecutions).
28. See 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966). For a discussion on the Court's motivation in deciding Miranda,see generally Kamisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents.- Some Comments
on the "New" Ffth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-69
(1966); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights- Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1978). The due process approach to self-incriminating statements did survive the Mirandadecision and is the sole governing standard when Miranda is
inapplicable. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (due process considerations apply when statements are to be used for impeachment); see also Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966) (interrogations conducted outside of custody are governed by due process standards).
29. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
30. See id at 444. The Court stated the general exclusionary rule that "the prosecution
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ent coercion for all custodial interrogation situations. 3 ' Only
administration of the warnings followed by a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the suspect's rights could effectively rebut this presumption and
allow use of statements obtained by police interrogation.3 2 The Court's

may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id at 444. The exclusionary rule was to
apply to all custodial interrogation situations and to all statements obtained therefrom, rejecting the case-by-case adjudication of the coerced confession doctrine. See id at 468. The
specific warnings were enunciated as "[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of any attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id at 444; accord California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360-61 (1981) (Miranda
warnings required but need not be word-for-word incantation so long as rights adequately
conveyed to suspect). The Court reaffirmed that the privilege against self-incrimination applies outside of the judicial context so as to include coerced confessions. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460-65 (1966); see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-41
(1897) (privilege extends beyond incrimination in trial court). See generally Kamisar, A
Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents.- Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the
Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 102-04 (1966) (defending Court for extending privilege to extrajudicial context).
31. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 467 (1966); see also Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 445-48 (1974) (statements obtained in custodial interrogation presumed compelled without warnings); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (custodial interrogation brings full threat of police against individual). The Mirandadecision defined custodial
interrogation as questioning initiated by the police in any setting in which a suspect is not
free to go. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The precise definition of
"custodial interrogation" has been a fertile field of controversy. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1981) (suspect in custody subject to renewed questioning by
police); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (interrogation determined by objective considerations); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (question of custody
centers upon restraint of freedom and need not be formal arrest). See generally Comment,
Rhode Island v. Innis, Custodial Interrogation Defined, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 696-708
(1981) (discussing what constitutes custodial interrogation); Comment, Rhode Island v. Innis.
A Workable Definition of "Interrogation"? 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 385, 399-404 (1981) (gives
several examples of custodial interrogation situations).
32. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-81 (1966). Miranda allows use of incriminating statements obtained after the suspect has intelligently and voluntarily waived
his rights as expressed in the warnings, or when the person is not in custody, or when the
suspect is not subject to interrogation. See id. at 475; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291, 301 (1980) (statements not result of interrogation by police not excluded by fifth amendment as interpreted in Miranda), North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979) (sufficient waiver allows use of incriminating statements). The state bears the burden in
establishing that the suspect did in fact waive his rights before the statement can be used.
See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979) (waiver must be established but
express waiver not required); accord Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-84 (1981)
(waiver of rights essential for use of incriminating statements obtained by police interrogation). See generally Sonenshein, Mirandaand the Burger Court. Trends and Countertrends,
13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 411,432 (1982) (discussing necessity and establishment of waiver).
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primary purpose in the decision was to provide "concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow" in the area
of interrogations and confessions. 33 Utilizing the Miranda exclusionary
rule, the Court sought, first, to protect the integrity of the accusatorial judicial system and, second, to protect the individual's dignity and free will.34
The Court eschewed a case-by-case determination of coercion by prohibiting the balancing of society's need for interrogation in some situations
against the suspect's constitutional privilege.35 Furthermore, the Miranda
warnings were created as constitutional requirements of the fifth amend-

33. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966). The guidelines established in
Miranda have "the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what
they may do in conducting custodial interrogations, and of informing courts under what

circumstances statements obtained during such interrogations are not admissible." See Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979); see also Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873-74
(5th Cir.) (Miranda established bright line), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980). See generally
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Laws of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863-64
(1979) (Court sought to establish a "bright line" rule for police and courts).
34. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448-50, 475-77 (1966). Informing a suspect
of his constitutional rights would protect the person from coercive trickery or persuasion and
allow a rational choice in waiving these rights. See Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights.- Reflections on Miranda v.Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 53 (1978). Deterrence
of improper police methods was not a primary purpose of Miranda but merely a result of
other goals. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); see also Berger, The Underprivileged Status of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 201-03 (1978)
(deterrence secondary purpose of Miranda); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit,
and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 295 (Miranda signalled change
in concern from blatant police activities to presumption of inherent coerciveness in any police interrogation). But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (deterrence of unlawful police conduct is the only purpose of Mirandds
exclusionary rule); George, The Fruits of Miranda.- The Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39
U. COLO. L. REv. 478, 489 (1967) (deterrence of improper police activities Court's social
goal in Miranda).
35. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); see also Orozco v. Texas, 394
U.S. 324, 325-27 (1969) (Miranda not to be put on scale of utilitarianism to determine its
applicability). The Court anticipated a utilitarian application of Miranda and rejected it,
stating:
A recurrent argument made in these cases is that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument is not unfamiliar to this Court. The whole thrust
of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights
of the individual when confronted with the power of government when it provided in
the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against
himself. That right cannot be abridged.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). See generally Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents.- Some Comments on the "New" Ffth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 70-75 (1966) (Miranda concluded that fifth amendment
required rejection of utilitarian application of exclusionary rule); Sonenshein, Miranda and
the Burger Court. Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 414 (1982) (discussing
Mirandds conclusive rejection of balancing approach to fifth amendment's privilege).
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ment, 36 and the use of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda was
37
absolutely prohibited.
With its emergence in the early 1970s, the Burger Court 38 began to modify the Mirandadecision. 39 An emphasis was placed on deterrence of unlawful police conduct as the primary purpose underlying the Miranda
exclusionary rule. 4' The Burger Court has reasoned that Mirandds exclu36. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) ("[T]he requirement of warnings
and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not
simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation."). For a discussion of the
constitutional basis for the Miranda warnings, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York.Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198, 1208-10 (1971).
37. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976) (Miranda and fifth amendment
violated only when statements used by prosecution at trial). The fifth amendment's exclusionary rule is activated in a two step process: (I) a Mirandaviolation in obtaining a statement, and (2) the use of that statement by the prosecution. See Gardner, The Emerging
Good Faith Exception to The Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 452 n.156
(1984); Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment. The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 413 (1977) (fifth amendment not violated until incriminating
statement used at trial).
38. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harrisv. New York.- Some Anxious Observations on the Candor andLogic of the EmergingNixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1198-99 (1971) (discussing
coalescing of "Burger Court" in criminal procedure cases); see also Israel, CriminalProcedure, The Burger Court, andthe Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1374-87
(1977) (modification of Mirandabegan as Burger majority asserted itself). Much criticism of
the Miranda decision preceded the Burger Court's ascendancy, including congressional attempts to undercut Mirandds influence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3502 (1982) (Title II of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires Miranda be considered but not
controlling in determining admissibility of statements in federal prosecutions). Lower courts
and prosecutors have generally refused to test the constitutionality of the sections, and the
Court has never ruled on the issue. See Gandara, Admissibility of Confessions in Federal
Prosecutions- Implementation of Section 3501 by Law Enforcement Officials and the Courts,
63 GEO. L.J. 305, 313-14 (1974). For a criticism of the Mirandadecision, see Sunderland,
Self-Incrimination and ConstitutionalPrinciple.- Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 171, 188-197 (1979).

39. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (Burger Court's first treatment of
Miranda allowed use of statement obtained without Miranda warnings to impeach testimony). The "Burger majority," in criminal procedure cases, has centered upon Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell, White, and retired Justice Stewart,
whose position Justice O'Connor is expected to fill. See Sonenshein, Mirandaandthe Burger
Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 406 (1982) (Burger majority is
identifiable on Mirandacases); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup.
CT. REV. 99, 100-01 (Burger majority not sympathetic to basic assumptions of Miranda
decision).
40. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1974) (exclusionary rule in selfincriminating cases based upon deterrence of police misconduct); Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (excluding statements from impeachment use would not carry out deterrence purpose of Miranda); accordBrewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Burger argued deterrence of illegal police conduct sole justifi-
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sionary rule should be applied only if it would deter unlawful police conduct and for no other reason." Relying upon this interpretation of
Miranda, the Court has held that statements obtained without sufficient
Mirandawarnings could be used to impeach the defendant's testimony.4 2
The Court next decided that the Mirandawarnings were not constitutional
requirements of the fifth amendment,43 but were merely judicially-created
safeguards." By refining the definition of custodial interrogation to allow
cation for excluding incriminating statements). But see Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326
(1969) (deterrence is at best a secondary purpose of Miranda rule); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (deterrence of police conduct secondary purpose of Miranda strictures).
The Burger Court has been criticized for its deterrence interpretation of Miranda. See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris P.New York. Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of
the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1212-30 (1971); Comment, The Declining
Miranda Doctrine. The Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues, 36 WASH. & LEE L.

REV. 259, 260-65 (1979) (discusses Burger Court's desire to return to due process approach
to incriminating statements).
41. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (exclusionary rule should only be
applied if deterrence results); accord Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1974) (Miranda's exclusionary rule loses its efficacy when deterrence will not result from its application). See generaly Berger, The Underprivileged Status of the Ffth Amendment Privilege, 15
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 203 (1978) (Burger Court's narrowing of Mirandds scope based on
deterrence interpretation of its rule); Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the
Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 455 (1984) (Burger Court's treatment of

Miranda cases premised on deterrence interpretation of exclusionary rule).
42. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (Miranda does not preclude use
of coerced statements for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52
(1974) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (Miranda does not apply to exclude statements from impeachment use). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (statements obtained
without benefit of warnings and waiver cannot be used to impeach defendant's testimony).
The Court, in Harris, dismissed Mirandds treatment of the impeachment question as dicta.
See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (Miranda decision does not speak directly
to impeachment question; therefore, any language within opinion on that point not binding).
The Harris decision has been criticized for its factual mischaracterization, its misuse of precedent, and its misreading of Miranda. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 230 (1971)
(Brennan, J.,
joined by Douglas, J., and Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Dershowitz & Ely,
Harris v. New York.: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging

Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1225-26 (1971) (Harris decision encourages police to
ignore Miranda). Not only did the Harris decision elevate the deterrence rationale, it also
marked the Court's return to balancing the Miranda rules against the benefits of using the
incriminating statements. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (197 1) ("[T]he benefits
of [the impeachment] process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative
possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.").
43. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). The Court relied heavily upon a
deterrence interpretation of Miranda to conclude that the warnings were not constitutional
rights. See id.at 448-50. But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966) (statements
obtained in absence of warnings do not meet standards of fifth amendment; therefore, warnings are constitutional requirements of fifth amendment).
44. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-46 (1974). The Court described the
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the use of incriminating statements obtained through indirect, unintentional police questioning, the Court has limited Mirandds effect.45 While
the Burger Court has maintained the absolute ban on using statements
obtained in violation of Mirandds requirements to prove the defendant's
guilt,46 there have been suggestions to implement certain exceptions to this
rule.4 7
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist have suggested that an exi-

Miranda warnings as "prophylactic standards ... to safeguard that privilege." See id. at
446. The Court analogized the Miranda strictures to the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule. See id. at 446. For a discussion of the Miranda warnings as merely "prophylactic
standards," see Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights: Reflections on Miranda v.
Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 57 (1978) (critique of conclusions in Tucker). The Court, in
Tucker, did reaffirm Mirandds prohibition on using statements obtained in violation of Miranda in the prosecution's case-in-chief. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445 (1974);
see also Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the MirandaRule-A Critique,35
HASTINGS L.J. 429, 463 (1984) (discussing inner conflict in Tucker decision).
45. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980) (conversation between police
which was not meant to elicit response from suspect not interrogation for Miranda purposes); see also Comment, The Supreme Court Narrows Definition of Interrogation to Allow
Admissions of Some Custodial Confessions-Rhode Island v. Innis, 32 S.C.L. REV. 611, 61821 (1981) (new definition undercuts Miranda conclusions by ignoring effectiveness of indirect police tactics); Comment, Rhode Island P.Innis. A Workable Definition of "Interrogation"' 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 385, 394-95 (1981) (questioning whether definition of
interrogation consistent with Mirandds basic presumptions). The Burger Court has also
modified the definition of waiver in the Mirandacontext to allow both express and implied
waiver of the warnings. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (requestioning of suspect
violated Miranda and must be excluded from prosecution's case-in-chief); Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981) (statements obtained without Miranda warnings in court-ordered psychiatric examination cannot be introduced in punishment phase of trial); Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 (1974) (statements that might be used for impeachment cannot
be used to establish guilt). See generally Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 169 (Court has remained true to core with regard to Mirandaprohibition on use of incriminating evidence in prosecution's case-in-chief). Several commentators have discussed the Burger Court's approach to exclusionary rules and Miranda cases.
Compare Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the CriminalProcess. Directionsand
Misdirections,52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 520, 555-61 (1977) (asserts that the Court uses factual
guilt of defendant to apply exclusionary rules) with Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger
Court: An Examination of Continuity and Changein CriminalProcedure,80 COLUM. L. REV.
436, 437 (1980) (asserts that Burger Court's decisions seek to ensure crime control).
47. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (fourth
and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules serve same deterrence purpose; therefore, same
exceptions should apply); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (Miranda
rule, based upon deterrence, should be subject to reasonable exceptions when deterrence
would not be served). See generally Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the
Miranda Rule-A Critique,35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 455-75 (1984) (questioning propriety of an
exception to Miranda).
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gency or good faith exception to the Mirandarule should exist. 4 8 Relying
heavily upon their previous interpretation of Miranda, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist both analogize the Miranda fifth amendment
exclusionary rule to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule.49 Utilizing
this approach, both conclude that the exigency and good faith exceptions
to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule should also apply to the Mirandafifth amendment rule." Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
also urge a return to an individual showing of actual coercion in each case

48. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (exception should exist to Miranda rule when police act in good faith since no deterrence of illegal
police conduct accomplished by excluding relevant evidence); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 447-50 (1974) (Justice Rehnquist stated that an exception to Mirandashould exist when
police act reasonably in custodial interrogation situations). For an examination of the Burger-Rehnquist approaches to an exigency or good faith exception to the Miranda rule, see
Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 456-66 (1984).

49. Compare Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(fourth and fifth amendment analogy is justified method of applying both exclusionary
rules) with Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ("Where the official action was
pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force.").
For a discussion on the propriety of analogizing the fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules, see Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Ffth Amendment; The Burger Court's
Definition,61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 417 n.168 (1977) (analogy between fourth and fifth amendments cannot be logically justified). The Supreme Court first recognized the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence
obtained in violation of fourth amendment cannot be used in federal prosecutions). The
Court later applied the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (evidence obtained through unconstitutional search and seizure cannot be
used in state proceeding). See generally Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement
of ConstitutionalPrinciple,69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 141, 158 (1978) (discussion of
creation and expansion of fourth amendment exclusionary rule).
50. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422-25 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (reasonable, good faith actions by officers in certain situations justify exception to both fourth
and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974)
(Justice Rehnquist states that reasonable, good faith actions by police should justify exception to both fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules). The Court has long recognized an exigency exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Michigan
v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (reasonable exigency justifies warrantless search and
seizure); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (hot pursuit of suspect justified
warrantless entry); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966) (exigency of retrieving
alcohol evidence in bloodstream allows seizure without warrant). The Court has only recently recognized a good faith exception to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule by
104 S.Ct. 3405,
utilizing a cost-benefit analysis. See United States v. Leon, - U.S. _
3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, - U.S. _ _ 104 S.
Ct. 3424, 3429, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 744 (1984) (good faith reliance on faulty warrant allows use
of evidence obtained with warrant). See generally LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an
Imperfect World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307,
335-61 (1982) (discussing "good faith" exception and its validity).
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before the fifth amendment would apply to require suppression of the incriminating evidence." A few lower courts have also broached the subject
of an exigency exception to the Mirandarequirements through an application of the rescue doctrine to custodial interrogations. 2 The majority of
to engraft an exigency exception on Micourts, however, have refused
5 3
randds strict requirements.
In New York v. Quarles, 4 the Supreme Court, following in part the suggestions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, explicitly adopted
a "public safety" exception to the Miranda fifth amendment exclusionary
rule.55 The existence of the "public safety" exception was not dependent

51. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (caseby-case determination of unlawful police conduct should be made before evidence suppressed); see also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444-46 (1974) (deterrence purpose of
Miranda requires determining whether purpose would be met, in that case, by excluding
evidence).
52. See People v. Riddle, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
937 (1979). An emergency exception to Miranda exists if there is "(1) [ulrgency of need in
that no other course of action promises relief; (2) [t]he possibility of saving human life by
rescuing a person whose life is in danger; (3) [r]escue as the primary purpose and motive of
the interrogators." See id at 173; see also People v. Modesto, 427 P.2d 788, 795, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 124, 127 (1967) (rescue doctrine allows inquiry when person's life in danger without
violating suspect's privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1965);
People v. Dean, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 561 (Ct. App. 1974) (rescue of missing person justified
interrogation without Miranda warnings). See generally Traynor, The Devils of Due Process
in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 675-77 (1966) (discussing
need for flexibility in self-incrimination area to avoid arbitrary rules). Other courts have
also discussed an emergency exception to Miranda if human life was at peril. See Cronk v.
State, 443 N.E. 2d 882, 884-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (questioning about bomb might be permissible even without Miranda warnings); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 439 A.2d 142, 144-45
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (hostage situation justified questioning about situation without Miranda warnings). Questioning by police in emergency situations has also been interpreted as
outside the definition of "interrogation" for Miranda purposes so as to allow use of incriminating evidence. See United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325, 326 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. See, e.g., Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (exigency
does not affect presumption that custodial interrogation inherently coercive; no exception to
Miranda recognized), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1981); People v. Manning, 672 P.2d 499,
510-11 (Colo. 1983) (no exigency exception to Miranda recognized because analogy to fourth
amendment unfounded); Whitfield v. State, 411 A.2d 415, 419-22 (Md. 1980) (no exigency
exception to Miranda exists). A suspect's statement about a missing gun obtained without
Miranda warnings being administered "must" be suppressed under state law even though
police had just apprehended the suspect. See Scott v. State, 571 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978). See generally Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda
Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 455-75 (1984) (exigency exception to Miranda constitutionally unjustified).
54. - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550 (1984).
55. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557. The majority sanctions the use
of incriminating statements in the prosecution's case-in-chief which were obtained without
the administering of Miranda warnings if the exception is shown to exist. See id. at - 104
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upon the subjective motivations of an officer, but was determined by the
reasonableness of the inquiry in light of the exigency and factual circumstances presented.5 6 In creating the "public safety" exception, the majority
began by stating that the Miranda warnings are not constitutional rights
but merely procedural safeguards to enforce the fifth amendment. 57 The
majority concluded, from this premise, that a failure to administer Miranda warnings does not result in a constitutional violation; therefore,
statements obtained without Miranda warnings are not automatically excluded by constitutional proscription. 58 Finding that the fifth amendment
itself did not preclude the use of Quarles' statement, the majority balanced
the costs of strict adherence to Mirandds procedural rules against the benefits of engrafting a "public safety" exception onto Miranda.5 9 The
S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559. The majority accepted that Quarles was in custody and
was interrogated by police. See id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 2629, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 554-55. In
creating this exigent exception to Miranda, the majority analogized the exception to the exigency exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. See id at - n.3, 104 S. Ct. at
2629 n.3, 81 L. Ed. at 555 n.3.
56. See id.at - 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557. While the majority emphasizes
the objective nature of the public safety exception, the exception's recognition is based upon
an individual officer's experience and instincts in such a situation. Compare id. at - 104 S.
Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 557 ("[Tlhe availability of that exception does not depend upon
the motivation of the individual officers involved.") with id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2633, 81 L.
Ed. 2d at 559 ("We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.").
57. See id. at 104 S. Ct. at 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 556. Miranda warnings are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected." See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631,
81 L. Ed. 2d at 556 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
58. See id at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 555. The majority interpreted the
fifth amendment's absolute exclusionary mandate as excluding only statements obtained
through official coercion. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 555. The majority
then rejected any presumption of coercion merely because Miranda warnings were not administered. See id. at - n.5, 104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 556 n.5. The majority
concluded that, lacking other evidence of coercion, statements obtained without benefit of
the prophylactic safeguards of Miranda were not automatically excluded by the fifth amendment, because no violation of the fifth amendment had occurred. See id at _ 104 S. Ct. at
2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 556. On remand, the majority would allow Quarles to argue that his
statement was obtained through actual coercion in violation of due process. See id at - n.5,
104 S. Ct. at 2631 n.5, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 556 n.5.
59. See id at , 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558. The majority stated that not
only would strict adherence to Miranda "cost" society fewer convictions of obviously guilty
persons because of the exclusion of relevant statements, but in many situations it would
mean prolonging a serious threat to public safety by precluding questioning. See id at
104 S. Ct. at 2632-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558. The Court also recognized a "cost" in requiring
officers to choose between eliminating the dangerous situation through quick questioning or
obeying Mirandds requirements and possibly deterring Quarles' response. See id at - 104
S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558. On the "benefit" side of the scale, the majority stated that
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Quarles majority struck the balance in favor of the benefits of the "public
safety"
exception and accepted a lessening of Mirandds recognized clarity. 6° The majority concluded a "public safety" exigency did exist 6 I and
62
that Quarles' statement could be used to establish his guilt.
A strong dissent 63 rejected the "public safety" exception to Miranda because through it, the dissent argued, the majority condoned the use of coerced self-incriminating statements in violation of the fifth amendment.6 4
Initially, the dissent challenged the majority's characterization of the facts
in creating its new exception, especially in light of the contradictory findings of the lower courts.65 The dissent next asserted that, in creating the
exception, the majority inexplicably abandoned the constitutional presumption of coercion established in Mirandafor custodial interrogations.6 6
elimination of the danger through immediate questioning, and limiting the questioning to
effectuate only this goal, was accomplished by the public safety exception to Miranda. See
id at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632-33, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558.
60. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558-59. While the majority recognized a lessening of Mirandds absolute requirements, it also maintained that the public
safety exception was a workable standard to guide police officers in exigent circumstances
without unreasonably sacrificing fifth amendment protection. See id. at -, 104 S. Ct. at
2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559.
61. See id. at ., 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558 ("So long as the gun was
concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously
posed more than one danger to the public safety .... ").
62. See id.at - 104 S. Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559. The Court remanded, sanctioning the use of all statements concerning the gun and the gun itself against the defendant.
See id. at , 104 S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559. The majority refused to consider an
inevitable discovery argument or a derivative non-testimonial argument. See id at - n.9,
104 S. Ct. at 2634 n.9, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559 n.9.
63. See id -, 104 S. Ct. at 2641-42, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 569 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 560
(O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
64. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2641-42, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 569 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also id. at -. , 104 S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 560 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
65. See id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 2642, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 570 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that the questionable factual analysis by the majority, in light of the lower
courts' findings, illustrated an underlying weakness of the exception-the police will be unable to determine when the exception exists in light of later ad hoc judicial determinations.
See id at .. , 104 S. Ct. at 2644, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 572-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id
at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2635, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 562 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) (later ad hoc determinations will undermine exception).
66. See id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 2647, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also id at -

104 S. Ct. at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and

concurring in part). Both dissents argue that the majority sub silentio abandoned Mirandds
coercion presumption and furthermore failed to explain how exigent circumstances lessen
the coerciveness present in custodial interrogations. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2647, 81 L.
Ed. 2d at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at - 104 S. Ct. at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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Third, the dissent argued that the "public safety" exception will encourage
the active coercion of suspects and justify the use of those coerced statements to convict the accused.67 Finally, the dissent asserted that the "public safety" exception undermines both the Miranda precedent and the fifth
amendment's effectiveness.6" Justice O'Connor, in a separate opinion,
joined in the dissent's rejection of the "public safety" exception to Miranda,69 but supported the use of the gun against Quarles because of its
non-testimonial nature.7 °
The Quarles decision is consistent with the Burger Court's past treatment of Miranda self-incrimination cases. 7 The "public safety" exception
is primarily based upon the Court's previous deterrence interpretation and
application of Miranda,72 a rationale justifying the Court's cost-benefit ap67. See id. at -. , 104 S. Ct. at 2647, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 576 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
public safety exception is efficacious precisely because it permits police officers to coerce

criminal defendants into making involuntary statements."); see also id at -, 104 S. Ct. at
2631, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
68. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2649, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 578 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see
also id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part). While Justice Marshall would affirm the order suppressing all of
Quarles' statements, he would remand to allow consideration on the admissibility of the gun
under the "inevitable discovery" rule of Nix v. Williams, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 377 (1984). SeeNew York v. Quarles,
U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2650, 81 L. Ed.
2d 550, 579 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 560 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). Justice O'Connor argued that no justification for the exigency exception had been sufficiently advanced; therefore, rejection of Mirandds clear requirements
should not occur. See id. - 104 S. Ct. at 2634, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 560 (O'Connor, J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part).
70. See id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2640, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). Justice O'Connor argued that Miranda prohibited use of only testimonial evidence; therefore, use of the gun was not prohibited by Mirandds strictures or the
fifth amendment exclusionary mandate. See id at _ 104 S. Ct. at 2639-40, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
564-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice O'Connor cited
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), to support this non-testimonial, derivative evidence argument. See New York v.
Quarles, - U.S. - -, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2637-38, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 564 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
71. Compare New York v. Quarles, - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d
550, 557 (1984) (public safety exception allows use of coerced self-incriminating statements
to prove defendant's guilt) with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (use of coerced
self-incriminating statements to impeach defendant allowed). See generally Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 168-69 (entire approach of Bur-

ger Court to Miranda characterized by narrowing decision's scope and effect).
72. See New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S. _

_

104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,

557 (1984) (no deterrence purpose served by excluding statements obtained when police
acted reasonably in questioning Quarles about hidden gun); see also Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (deterrence prime justification of Miranda exclusionary rule);
Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
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proach to Mirandaand the fifth amendment.7 3 The "public safety" exception is also consistent with prior suggestions of an analogy between the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule and the Miranda fifth amendment
rule and the conclusion that the exigency exception does apply to both
rules. 4 Furthermore, the decision reflects the Court's past desire to return
to an actual coercion standard, determined on a case-by-case basis, for the
exclusion of relevant, testimonial evidence.7 5 By ignoring a contradictory
lower court determination that no threat to the public safety actually existed at the time of the questioning,76 the Quarlesmajority also continues
the Court's trend of independent fact-finding, employed in prior Miranda

405, 421, 427 (1982) (Burger Court's treatment of Mirandacases premised upon deterrence
theory of Miranda).

73. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-50 (1974) (deterrence theory allows balancing of interests to determine if deterrence of police conduct served); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1980) (statements obtained through unintentional police
conversation not suppressed because cost of exclusion outweighs deterrence of any police
misconduct); Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court and the Legacy of the Warren

Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1320, 1378-80 (1977) (Burger Court's adoption of deterrence purpose of Mirandaallows balancing approach to determine necessity of suppression).
74. Compare New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S.

-,

n.3, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3, 81 L.

-

Ed. 2d 550, 555 n.3 (1984) (fourth amendment exigency exception based on reasonableness;
exception to Mirandarequires reasonableness of exigency) with Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 421-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (both rules serve some deterrence purposes;
therefore, when deterrence of illegal police conduct does not occur through suppression of
evidence, exception should exist). See also Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974)
(underlying deterrence rationales justify analogy between fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules). See generally Stone, The Miranda Doctrinein the Burger Court, 1977 Sup.
CT. REV.

99, 124-25 (Burger Court may utilize fourth-fifth amendment analogy to modify

Miranda's strictures).

75. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. n.5, -, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631 n.5, 2632, 81
L. Ed. 2d 550, 556 n.5, 557 (1984) (exigency exception determined by circumstances of individual case; due process approach may also be utilized to gain suppression); see also North
Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375 (1979) (case-by-case determination of waiver of Miranda rights permissible); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Mirandds exclusionary requirement should not be automatic, but utilized only
after determination of necessity in that case); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-50
(1974) (case-by-case approach to use of self-incriminating statements would better serve fifth
amendment and society's needs). See generally Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court.

Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 435 (1982) (Burger Court continually
attempts to revive case-by-case due process approach to incriminating statements).
76. See People v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (1982) ("[T]here
is no evidence in the record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to
public safety or that the police interrogation was prompted by any such concern."), rev'dand
remanded sub nom. New York v. Quarles, - U.S.
(1984); see also New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _ -,

550, 570-71 (1984)
determination).

104 S. Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550
104 S. Ct. 2626, 2642-43, 81 L. Ed. 2d

-,

(Marshall, J., dissenting) (majority ignores lower court's fact
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cases, to support its conclusion.7 7 While the Quarles decision embodies
many of the Court's recent modifications of Miranda,it also contains practical and constitutional inconsistencies resulting from the Burger Court's
78
interpretation and application of Miranda.
In creating a "public safety" exception to Mirandds clear dictates,7 9 the
Quarles majority fails to establish similar clear standards to aid police in

77. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S. _ _

104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d

550, 557 (1984) ("We hold that on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception .... ");
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (Court determined facts did not establish
"interrogation" of suspect even though lower court found police intended to elicit incriminating evidence); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (Court ignores lower court
determination of due process violation). The Burger Court's decisions have often been criticized for a lack of acceptance of lower court factual determinations. See Dershowitz & Ely,
Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1201-04 (1971); Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the
Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 414-19 (1977) (factual determinations often ignored in order to facilitate conclusions in Miranda-type cases).
The Burger Court's independent fact-finding in criminal procedure cases may be a crucial
element in its overall treatment and objective in applying exclusionary rules. See Chase,
The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Process. Directions and Misdirections, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 518, 520-21 (1977) (Court often determines "factual guilt" to ensure evidence is used against accused to convict); Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court.- An
Examination of Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 436, 44856 (1980) (Burger Court's social engineering and crime prevention goals often require "factual corrections" to ensure guilty suspects incarcerated).
78. See, e.g., Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A
Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 465-68 (1984) (Burger Court has misinterpreted Miranda
and has, in effect, eviscerated the decision without overruling it directly); Schrock, Welsh &
Collins, Interrogational Rights. Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56-

60 (1978) (through re-interpretation of Miranda, Burger Court has raised fundamental constitutional conflicts in self-incrimination area); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 123-26, 169 (Burger Court has modified Miranda in such ways
as to allow for its express overruling). The Court has been criticized for its application of
Miranda and the resulting lack of clarity in workable guidelines. See Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda. What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Matter, 67 G EO.
L.J. 1, 19-24 (1978); Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the FifIh Amendment. The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 412-19 (1977) (Burger Court has consistently
blurred bright line of Miranda).
79. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (statements obtained without
required warnings cannot be used at trial to prove defendant's guilt); see also Harryman v.
Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 873-74 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Miranda procedures have virtue of establishing clear guidelines for police, prosecutors, and courts), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980).
Through strict adherence to Mirandds procedures and prohibitions, the "meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures." See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
generally Stephens, Flanders & Cannon, Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court: Police

Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407, 431 (1972) (police aided in
complying with Miranda because of simplicity and clarity). The Miranda rules have been
praised for their clarity, and modification of the rules has prompted protest. See Fare v.
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recognizing and conforming to the new exception. 8° The majority couches
its exception in objective terms, but then relies upon the individual officer
to recognize the exigency through instincts and experience and to conform
his questioning only to the removal of the danger. 8 Such an approach is
reminiscent of the Court's refinement of the term "interrogation" in Rhode
Island v. Innis,82 in that a supposedly objective test is established and then
confused by reliance upon an individual officer's personal perceptions in
the situation.8 3 Furthermore, the majority fails to enunciate any minimal
criteria to aid police or courts in recognizing the existence of the excep-

Michael C., 439 U.S. 1310, 1314 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers on application for
stay). Justice Rehnquist stated:
[Mirandds] supporters saw. . . rigidity as the strength of the decision. It afforded police and courts clear guidance on the manner in which to conduct a custodial investigation: if it was rigid, it was also precise. But this core virtue of Miranda would be
eviscerated if the prophylactic rules were freely augmented by other courts under the
guise of "interpreting" Miranda.
Id at 1314. See generally Kanisar, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents.- Some Comments
on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60-61
(1966) (while Miranda not perfect, its strictures are clear and workable).
80. Compare New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _ - 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d
550, 559 (1984) (officers will, through instinct and experience, recognize exception) with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (prior to any custodial interrogation, warnings
must be given by police).
81. Compare New York v. Quarles, - U.S..... 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d
550, 557 (1984) ("exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers
involved") with id at - 104 S. Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 559 ("[W]e think police officers
can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own
safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence
from a suspect.").
82. See 446 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1980). In interpreting Miranda, the Burger Court, in
Innis, sought to clarify lower court conflicts as to indirect questioning methods, but the result
was further confusion. See White, Interrogation Without Questions.- Rhode Island v. Innis
and UnitedStates v. Henry, 78 MIcH. L. REV. 1209, 1223 (1980); Comment, Rhode Island v.
Innis, CustodialInterrogationDefined 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 708-15 (1981) (effectiveness
of Innis test questionable at best).
83. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301-03 (1980) ("[D]efinition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect" but depends upon the officer's foreseeable intent
on eliciting statements). The lack of clarity in rules like Innis or Quarles not only jeopardizes constitutional rights, but also requires additional burdensome litigation to gain clarity.
See Sonenshein, The Miranda Doctrine and the Burger Court.- Trends and Countertrends, 13
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 439 (1982). The need for clarity in creating criminal procedure rules
has long been the Supreme Court's objective. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824 (1982) (bright line in procedure area ensures both individual's rights and governmental
concerns); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (Mirandaestablished clear guidelines
for procedural interrogations); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (specific procedural rules necessary to remove ambiguities that would encourage police to test rules at expense of suspect).
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tion.8 4 In the past, the Court strictly applied Mirandds requirements to
situations where the police were questioning a suspect about a missing
weapon,8 5 but the Quarles majority now abandons this precedent in favor
of an exception defined and "circumscribed by the exigency which justifies
it."'8 6 The end result of such an exception will be conflicting ad hoc judicial interpretations of exigency, 87 confusion among possibly well-intentioned police officers, 8 and imperilment of an accused's constitutional
84. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S . .
104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
557 (1984) ("[OQn these facts there is a 'public safety' exception."). In the one jurisdiction
that has recognized an exigency exception consistently, the following criteria must be present: "(1) Urgency of need in that no other course of action promises relief; (2) The possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger; (3) Rescue as the
primary purpose and motive of the interrogators." See People v. Riddle, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170,
177 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,440 U.S. 937 (1979). The failure to enunciate limitations
upon the exigency exception could result in the exception becoming the rule and the observance of Miranda the exception. See Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the
Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 474-75 (1984); see also Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 124-25 (reasonableness-based
exception to Miranda would undermine rule entirely).
85. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02 (1980) (police required to give
Mirandawarnings to suspect before they could question him about missing shotgun); Orozco
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (suspect entitled to warnings prior to questioning by
police about missing handgun); see also New York v. Quarles, - U.S...n.2, 104 S. Ct.
2626, 2643 n.2, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 571 n.2 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (no distinction
between Orozco and Quarles exists).
86. New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S.

,

-

104 S. Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 559

(1984). The majority also fails to explain what facts distinguish its conclusion from a directly contradictory lower court determination. Compare id at -, 104 S. Ct. at 2632, 81 L.
Ed. 2d at 557 ("We hold that on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception.") with People
v. Quarles, 444 N.E.2d 984, 985, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (1982) ("[T]here is no evidence in the
record before us that there were exigent circumstances posing a risk to the public safety."),
rev'd and remandedsub nom. New York v. Quarles, - U.S. - 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L. Ed. 2d
550 (1984). The Court's failure to enunciate such distinguishing facts does not aid the subsequent attempts of courts in applying the new exception; this demonstrates an underlying
weakness of the exception. See New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S ....

104 S.Ct. 2626, 2644,

81 L. Ed. 2d 550, 572-73 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. See New York v. Quarles,

-

U.S.

-,

_ 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,

562 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (Miranda reasonably
clear rule to both police and judges, but new exigency exception will spawn needless ad hoc
determinations on admissibility of statements); see also Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the
Fifth Amendment. The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L.REV. 383, 417-20 (1977) (Mirandds strict requirements avoid needless ad hoc determinations of admissibility; any modification would undermine benefit).
88. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
judgment) (failure to maintain Mirandds specific requirements places officers in precarious
position because "few, if any, police officers are competent to make the kind of evaluation
seemingly contemplated"). See generally Stephens, Flanders & Cannon, Law Enforcement
and the Supreme Court. Police Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV.
407, 431 (1972) (police have clear guidelines from Miranda decision requirements).
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privilege against self-incrimination. 89
The Quarles majority also abandons the constitutional presumption of
coercion for custodial interrogations established in Miranda.9° This rejection is significant since the presumption of coercion is the core premise of
Miranda9 and the primary trigger of the Miranda fifth amendment exclusionary rule.92 In carving out the "public safety" exception, the majority
89. See, e.g., Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger
Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 429-31 (1977) (imprecise modification of Miranda
threatens privilege against self-incrimination); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational
Rights. Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 60 (1978) (modification of
Mirandds strict requirement may sacrifice the privilege); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 168-69 (Burger Court's approach to self-incrimination
cases threatens not only Miranda but privilege itself); see also Comment, The Declining Miranda Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Development of Miranda Issues, 36 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 259, 273-75 (1979) (lessening effect of Miranda decision threatens self-incrimination
privilege).
n.5, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2631 n.5, 81 L.
90. Compare New York v. Quarles, - U.S.,
Ed. 2d 550, 556 n.5 (1984) ("Today we merely reject the only argument that respondent has
raised to support the exclusion of his statement, that the statement must be presumed compelled because of Officer Kraft's failure to read him his Miranda warnings.") with Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (any custodial interrogation inherently coercive and
any statement obtained without warnings and waiver presumed compelled). See generally
Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 463 n.228 (1984) (Court has rejected presumption of coercion in "public
safety" situations).
91. See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (custodial interrogation
inherently coercive in all situations under Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 44748, 452 (1974) (statements obtained without warnings and waiver presumed compelled by
Miranda); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969) (Mirandds primary purpose to recognize that all custodial interrogations are inherently coercive); see also Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 481-83 (1981) (core premise of Miranda is inherent coercion in all custodial
interrogations); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (Miranda presumes coercion
in custodial interrogation unless warnings and waiver are present). The presumption of
coercion has been regarded as the most significant element of Miranda. See, e.g., Berger,
The Underprivileged Status of the Ffih Amendment Privilege, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 20203 (1978) (presumption of coercion marks a significant advance from due process treatment
of self-incriminating statements); Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents.- Some
Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L.

59, 65 (1966) (Miranda alters previous treatment of incriminating statements through
absolute presumption); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43 n.176 (1978) (Mirandds presumption of coercion
drastically altered treatment of incriminating statements).
92. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 315 (1976) (violation of Miranda raises
presumption of coercion; if statements used in criminal prosecution, fifth amendment requires suppression). The fifth amendment exclusionary rule is usually characterized as a
two-step conditional process: (I) the statement must be coerced, and (2) the statement must
be used against the defendant at trial; Miranda is important in satisfying the first condition.
See Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.New York.- Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and
Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1214 (1971); see also Ritchie,
REV.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss2/10

20

Goodman: An Exception to Administering Miranda Warnings Exists Where Polic

1985]

CASENOTES

fails to explain how the exigency of the missing gun lessens the presumed
coercion of the interrogation of Benjamin Quarles. 93 As argued by the
dissent, if this exigency does not eliminate the presumed coercion of
Quarles, then the majority sanctions the use of compelled, incriminating
statements against Quarles to prove his guilt or, in essence, condones the
abandonment of Mirandaand the violation of the fifth amendment. 94 The
majority recognizes that exigency is based upon the reasonableness of an
officer's actions in the situation, but the Court fails to explain how a reasonableness-based exception satisfies the absolute requirements of the Miranda fifth amendment exclusionary rule. 95 In rejecting the presumption
that Quarles' statement was improperly compelled, the majority also encourages a utilitarian determination of coercion, similar to the due process
coerced confession approach, and a further withdrawal from the Miranda
precedent. 96 In the end, the majority's failure to cogently justify the aban-

Compulsion that Violates the Ffth Amendment. The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 413 (1977) (fifth amendment only excludes use of incriminating statements that
are compelled from accused).
93. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. - _, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2647, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
575 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at _ 104 S. Ct. at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 56263 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (exigency does not alter presumption of coercion established by Miranda); Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870, 875 (5th
Cir. 1980) (en banc) (exigency does not affect presumption that custodial interrogation inherently coercive), cert. denied,449 U.S. 860 (1981); Whitfield v. State, 411 A.2d 415, 419-22
(Md. 1980) (possible exigency of prison control does not affect Mirandds presumption).
94. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _ _, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2648, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
576-77 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also id. at _ 104 S. Ct. at 2636, 81 L. Ed. 2d at
563 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
95. Seeid at - n.3, 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n.3, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 555 n.3. The requirements to
satisfy the fourth and fifth amendments have always been of a different nature; reasonableness satisfies the fourth amendment while it does not satisfy the fifth amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976) (fourth and fifth amendments protect different rights and satisfied by different standards); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400
(1976) ("Fifth Amendment's strictures, unlike the Fourth's, are not removed by showing
reasonableness"); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973) (fourth and fifth
amendments' rights are "of a wholly different order"; therefore, different standards exist to
satisfy each amendment).
96. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. _____ 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2630-32, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
555-57 (1984). The Burger Court has never fully accepted the Mirandaprecedent and prefers the due process approach to incriminating statements. See, e.g., Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York.: Some Anxious Observationson the CandorandLogic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1226-27 (1971) (Burger Court approach encourages case-bycase determinations of coercion in lieu of Mirandds presumption); Sonenshein, Mirandaand
the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 434-35 (1982)
(Court's emphasis upon cost-benefit analysis in Miranda area reminiscent of case-by-case
due process approach which Court prefers); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger
Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 168-69 (Mirandaslowly being abandoned by Burger Court in
favor of due process approach). The Mirandadecision sought to correct the inadequacies of
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donment of the coercion presumption undermines the constitutional position of the
"public safety" exception and jeopardizes the vitality of
97
Miranda.
The Quarles majority also incorrectly utilizes an analogy between the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule and the Miranda fifth amendment
exclusionary rule to justify a cost-benefit treatment of the latter, the result
of which is the exigent "public safety" exception.98 In the fourth amendment area, the cost-benefit analysis is employed because the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule is not constitutionally essential9 9 and is satisfied
by reasonable official conduct." ° In contrast, the Miranda fifth amend-

the due process approach by precluding case-by-case determinations of coercion and utilitarian approaches to the fifth amendment. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 424 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (encouraged
case-by-case application of Mirandarule in all custodial interrogation situations).
97. See Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the MirandaRule-A Critique,
35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 474-75 (1984) (Court's failure to address Mirandaprecedent squarely
places vitality of that precedent in question and jeopardizes constitutional rights); Ritchie,
Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment.- The Burger Court's Definitions, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 416-17, 431 (1977) ("re-interpretation" of Miranda is, in effect, slow, confusing
method of overruling Miranda).
104 S.Ct. 2626, 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
98. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. 558 (1984). The majority stated: "[w]e conclude that the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." See id.at - 104 S.
Ct. at 2633, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 558. An analogy between the fourth and fifth amendments'
exclusionary rules has been suggested in previous Miranda-type cases. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421-22 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Miranda-fifth amendment exclusionary rule and fourth amendment, exclusionary rule both "judicially remedial
devices"); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-50 (1974) (fourth and fifth amendments'
rules serve similar purposes). See generally Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth
Amendment. The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 417 n.168 (1977) (Burger
Court analogizes fourth and fifth amendments' exclusionary rules). The Court's analogy is
based upon its deterrence interpretation of both the fourth amendment exclusionary and the
Miranda rules. Compare United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (judiciallycreated fourth amendment exclusionary rule based primarily on deterrence effect) with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971) (deterrence primary motivation behind Mirandds strictures on custodial interrogation).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (fourth amendment's exclusionary rule not required by Constitution); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976)
(fourth amendment exclusionary rule creation of judicial discretion); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (fourth amendment rule "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard fourth amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect"); see also LaFave,
The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World- On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good
Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 317-20 (1982) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule, delegated to subconstitutional status, subject to cost-benefit treatment).
100. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978); see also Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976) (fourth amendment satisfied by reasonableness). The Court has
routinely approached the fourth amendment exclusionary rule with a cost-benefit analysis,
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ment exclusionary rule is a constitutional necessity not satisfied by reasonableness;' 0 ' therefore, a balancing approach is inapplicable because it
threatens the constitutional mandate itself. 10 2 A cost-benefit analysis is
also inappropriate in the fifth amendment area because the Miranda fifth
amendment exclusionary rule is not based primarily upon a deterrence
theory, the justification for the balancing approach in the fourth amendment area,'0 3 but is premised upon protection of the individual and ensuring the integrity of the adversarial system."° As evidenced by the

most recently in recognizing a "good faith" exception to the warrant requirement. See
United States v. Leon, - U.S. - -, 104 S.,Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 698 (1984)
(good faith of police negates strict application of exclusionary rule); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

104 S. Ct. 3424, 3429, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737, 744 (1984) (cost of strict

adherence to warrant requirement outweighed by need to utilize evidence obtained through
good faith reliance on faulty warrant). See generally Ball, Good Faithand the FourthAmendment: The "Reasonable'Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
635, 649-57 (1978) (cost-benefit tool employed to restrict or expand fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule).
101. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person.., shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."); see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443
(1976) (fifth amendment's exclusionary rule absolute constitutional requirement in contrast
to fourth amendment's exclusionary rule); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966)
("Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them."). The Mirandadecision emphasized that the Miranda warnings were constitutional requirements not subject to judicial modification. See id
at 476 ("The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is fundamental with respect to
the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of
interrogation."); see also Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT.
REV. 99, 110-11 (balancing approach to Miranda-fifth amendment exclusionary rule prohibited). The Burger Court has often characterized Mirandarules as "prophylactic safeguards"
similar to the judicially created fourth amendment safeguards, but such an interpretation
has been criticized as inconsistent with Miranda and the fifth amendment. See Schrock,
Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights. Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 38-41 (1978).
102. See New York v. Quarles, - U.S. - - 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2649, 81 L. Ed. 2d 550,
578 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court:
Trends and Countertrends,13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 434-35 (1982) (constitutional exclusionary rule cannot be subject to ad hoc application or it loses all effectiveness).
103. See United States v. Leon,

U.S. __ __ 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419-21, 82 L. Ed. 2d

677, 696-98 (1984) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule primarily based upon deterrence;
therefore, balancing costs and benefits justified); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974) (judicially-created safeguard subject to balancing in application).
104. See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (fifth amendment's privilege
works to protect integrity of judicial system); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 15 (1964) (fifth
amendment privilege protects individual when confronted by all-powerful state). The Burger Court's deterrence interpretation of Mirandaconflicts with the basic analysis provided in
Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); see also Gardner, The Emerging
Good Faith Exception to the MirandaRule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 474-75 (1984)
(deterrence interpretation of Miranda based upon misinterpretation of fifth amendment and
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reasoning employed to create the "public safety" exception, the majority's
reliance on deterrence necessity and cost-benefit balancing threatens to reduce the protection of the self-incrimination privilege'o 5 and may also portend a continuing retreat from the Miranda precedent. 116
The "public safety" exception to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona
marks a substantial alteration in the confrontation between 1olice and citizen in a custodial interrogation. By recognizing the exception, the Court
apparently frees police from the constraints of Mirandain order to ensure
public safety. The Court's decision, however, fails to adequately define or
justify the exception so that it may consistently be recognized without
needlessly sacrificing an individual's constitutional privilege against selfincrimination. Even more confusing and threatening is the Court's treatment of the Mirandaprecedent. The majority's casual rejection of the constitutional presumption of coercion for custodial interrogations and its
cost-benefit approach to the fifth amendment's exclusionary rule are simply not consistent with the precedent set forth in Miranda. The Court's
failure to cogently justify the Quarles decision not only threatens the privilege against self-incrimination but also disserves the Court's responsibility
to enunciate a constitutionally sound and clear law governing incriminating statements.
Stephen S. Goodman IV

untenable analogy to fourth amendment); Stone, The MirandaDoctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 168-69 (balancing approach to Miranda based upon improper em-

phasis on deterrence).
105. See Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429, 474-75 (1984) (creation of reasonable or good faith exception to
Miranda-fifth amendment exclusionary rule will reduce protection offered accused by privi-

lege against self-incrimination).
106. See, e.g., Berger, The UnderprivilegedStatus of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 15
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 228-30 (1978) (Burger Court has continually moved away from
precedent established in Miranda); Schrock, Welsh & Collins, InterrogationalRights. Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56-60 (1978) (Burger Court has withdrawn
from Miranda throughout its tenure); Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court.- Trends
and Countertrends,13 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 407 (1982) (Burger Court has undermined basic
assumptions of Miranda through its case considerations and applications).
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